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This paper presents a monetary model in which interbank mar-
kets bear limited commitment to contracts. Limited commitment
reduces the proportion of assets that can be used as collateral,
and thus banks with high liquidity demands face borrowing con-
straints in interbank markets. These constraints can be relieved
by the central bank (a lender of last resort) through the provision
of liquidity loans. I show that the constrained-eﬃcient allocation
can be decentralized by controlling only the money growth rate if
commitment to interbank contracts is not limited. Otherwise, a
proper combination of central bank loans and monetary policy is
needed to bring the market equilibrium into a state of constrained
eﬃciency.
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11 Introduction
Interbank markets are one of the most important systems in a modern
economy because they allow liquidity to be readily transferred from banks
with a surplus to those with a deﬁcit. Therefore, they are the focus of
monetary policy and have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the whole economy. On
occasion, however, the markets malfunction, as they did during the crisis
that started in the summer of 2007. At these times, central banks needs
to make the large-scale interventions to prevent the situation from futher
deteriorating. The importance of a lender of last resort (LLR), dating
back to Bagehot (1873), is stressed by many economists, but there is
much less consensus on the nature of its role. For example, Fischer (1999,
p. 86) states that “While there is considerable agreement on the need for
a domestic lender oﬂast resort, some disagreements persist about what
the lender of last resort should do.”1
The purpose of this paper is to provide a monetary model for under-
standing the role of an LLR in an economy with an imperfect interbank
market. In the model of this paper, interbank markets provide insurance
for banks against the risk of sudden liquidity demands, but this insurance
may be damaged by the limited commitment problem. Limited commit-
ment denotes the inability of individual banks to fully commit to debt
repayment. If this problem is signiﬁcant, the banks’ assets can be used as
collateral, and banks that experience high liquidity shocks may be sub-
ject to borrowing constraints of the form studied by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). In a crisis, limited commitment is attributed to the incapacity of
troubled banks to borrow money from healthy banks.
My analysis is based on the works of Champ et al. (1996) and Smith
(2002). I employ an overlapping generations model in which spatial sep-
aration and limited communication generate a transactions role for ﬁat
money. At the end of each period, a fraction of agents is relocated to a
diﬀerent location. The only asset that they can use is ﬁat money. This
allows money to be held even when dominated in the rate of return. Lim-
ited communication implies that relocated agents cannot transact using
privately issued liabilities in the new location. However, agents who are
1See also Goodfriend and King (1988), Bordo (1990), and Kaufman (1991).
2not relocated are not constrained by the rule of limited communication:
they can pay for consumption goods with checks or other credit instru-
ments when they are old. The other asset is a storage technology. The
stochastic relocations act like shocks to agents’ liquidity preferences, and
create a role for banks to provide insurance against these shocks, as in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
The model also assumes that a location is divided into a number of
ex ante identical regions, each of which contain a number of depositors
and a representative bank that behaves competitively. Diﬀerent regions
receive diﬀerent liquidity shocks; this gives rise to regional heterogeneity,
which motivates interbank trades. The basic role of interbank markets
is to allow reallocations of liquidity from banks with an excess to banks
with a deﬁcit. As noted above, however, the markets may be imperfect
because of the limited commitment problem.
The main results of the paper are as follows: (i) the market equilibrium
can achieve constrained eﬃciency in perfect interbank markets when the
central bank implements zero-inﬂation policy; (ii) when interbank mar-
kets malfunction because of limited commitment, banks cannot diversify
their liquidity risks; consequently, the market equilibrium cannot achieve
constrained eﬃciency, even if the central bank implements optimal mon-
etary policy; (iii) if the central bank prints money and lends freely to the
banking system at the same interest rate as interbank markets do, all
banks that face borrowing constraints can meet liquidity demands by ob-
taining the central bank loans; consequently, the market equilibrium will
achieve constrained eﬃciency under the implementation of zero-inﬂation
policy.
Several other papers have studied the imperfections of interbank mar-
kets and the role of the central bank intervention in mitigating these im-
perfections. Aghion et al. (1999) and Allen and Gale (2000) analyze the
spread of banking failure through interbank markets. Diamond and Ra-
jan (2005) investigate optimal liquidity provision by a central bank when
interbank markets are subject to aggregate liquidity shocks and conta-
gious failure. Acharya et al. (2008) study the imperfections of interbank
markets in times of crisis due to moral hazard, asymmetric information,
3and monopoly power, and show that central bank lending can ameliorate
the ineﬃciency. Allen and Gale (2009) consider incomplete interbank
markets that result in limited hedging opportunities for banks, and they
show that a central bank can implement the constrained-eﬃcient allo-
cation by using open-market operations. Freixas et al. (2010) examine
two diﬀerent types of liquidity shocks to the banking system, and show
that the central bank can implement the constrained-eﬃcient allocation
by setting interest rates that depend on the pattern of the shocks.
The main diﬀerence between these studies and mine is that my model
explicitly assesses the role of money . In practice, the central bank has
two important function: to control the money supply, and, as the LLR,
to lend money to a banking systems. However, most of existing literature
on the LLR does not consider monetary policy. In contrast, the model
described here allows us to study not only optimal monetary policy and
optimal LLR policy but also the interaction between these policies.
This paper bears a close theoretical similitude to the works of Anti-
nolﬁ et al. (2001) and Antinolﬁ and Keister (2006). This is because
it studies the role of LLR policy by combining the overlapping genera-
tions model with random relocation. Antinolﬁ et al. (2001) study the
relationship between various LLR policies and inﬂationary equilibria in
a pure-exchange economy. They show that an LLR policy in which the
central bank lends money freely at a zero nominal interest rate generates
Pareto optimal steady-state equilibrium, but also generates non-optimal
inﬂationary equilibria, and suggest several LLR regimes that do not gen-
erate non-optimal equilibria. Antinolﬁ and Keister (2006) study an LLR
policy and a monetary policy in a similar environment, and show that
the policy combination achieves a state of the market equilibrium that
closely approximates the ﬁrst-best allocation of resources. Their LLR
policy plays a key role in mitigating communication friction, which gen-
erates a transaction role for money. In contrast, this paper focuses on the
ineﬃciency of interbank markets and a corrective LLR policy. That is, it
focuses on using the LLR to reduce, not the communication friction, but
friction caused by limited commitment within interbank markets. Thus,
this paper considers how the constrained-eﬃcient allocation, as chosen
4by a planner facing communication friction but not limited commitment,
can be decentralized through monetary policy and LLR policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model of the study, from which Section 3 derives the constrained-eﬃcient
allocation. Section 4 reviews the behavior of banks in economies with
perfect and imperfect interbank markets. Section 5 discusses equilibria in
both types of economies, and Section 6 introduces the role of the LLR.
Section 7 considers an LLR-created equilibrium, and how LLR policy
leads market equilibrium to the constrained-eﬃcient allocation. Finally,
Section 8 concludes the investigation. All omitted proofs and some diﬃ-
cult derivations are contained in Appendices A and B, respectively.
2 The Model
I consider an economy consisting of an inﬁnite sequence of overlapping
generations that live for two periods. Periods are represented by t =
0,1,2,.... The world is divided into two spatially separated locations,
and each location consists of a number of regions of unit mass. Each
region is populated by a continuum of agents of unit mass. The two
locations are completely symmetrical in terms of economic activity.
All young agents are ex ante identical. They are endowed with w units
of goods when young, and none when old. In addition, there is a storage
technology that convers one unit of goods stored at period t to R > 1
units of consumption at period t + 1.
All agents care only about second-period consumption. Let ct de-
note the second-period consumption of a representative agent born at t.
Agents have the same lifetime utility, u(c) = ln(c).2
As in Townsend (1987), I introduce a transaction role for money by
emphasizing that the two locations are spatially separated and that com-
munication between them is limited. Limited communication prevents
privately issued liabilities from being veriﬁable in the other location.
2As in Champ et al. (1996) and others, this assumption of logarithmic utility
allows us to solve the banks’ problem analytically.
5However, money is universally recognizable and impossible to noncoun-
terfeitable, and is therefore accepted in both locations. In addition,
during each period, agents can trade and communicate only with other
agents in the same location.
After deposits have been allocated between investments and cash bal-
ances, a fraction π of young agents in each region is relocated to the other
location. These agents are called “movers”. The value of π is diﬀerent
across regions. Relocation plays the role of a “liquidity preference shock”
in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, and it is natural to assume
that banks arise to insure agents against these shocks. The relocation
probability π is a random variable, and because there is a continuum of
young agents, it represents the fraction of all movers in each region. It
also represents the aggregate liquidity in a region, and higher realizations
of π correspond to higher demand for money. This is publicly observable,
independent across regions, and identically distributed over time. Let F
represent the distribution function, which is assumed to be smooth and
strictly increasing on [0,1], and f the associated density function. The
distribution F is common knowledge. Thus, the number of movers from
each region within a location is E(π) 
∫ 1
0 πf(π)dπ.
To illustrate the role of interbank markets, I consider an economy
where an intermediary is allowed to operate in only one region. In the
past, legal restrictions of this form were common in the United States
(US) and Japan. Even today, many banks in both countries operate
only within a small region because of their size. After the realization of
the liquidity shock, interbank markets open, and bank-to-bank transac-
tions occur. Banks with high liquidity demands decide to borrow money
through the markets, while banks with low liquidity demands decide to
lend remaining cash reserves. It is assumed that a limited commitment
problem exists in these ﬁnancial markets. Banks that have borrowed
money have the option of default, in which case the external enforcement
agency can seize only a fraction of their assets. Thus, the assumption
of limited commitment creates a role for collateral and the possibility of
credit constraints.
Let Mt denote the per capita money supply at period t. The money
6supply grows at the exogenously selected gross rate σ, chosen once and
for all in the initial period. Monetary injections are accomplished via
lump-sum transfers to young agents. Let τt denote the real value of the
transfers received by young agents at period t. In addition, let pt denote
the price levels at period t, and let mt = Mt/pt denote real balances at





The initial money supply, M0, is given.
I assume that σR  1. In a steady-state equilibrium, σR is the mar-
ket’s nominal interest rate, and money is dominated in rate of return by
storage technology. Note that the money growth rate satisﬁes σR = 1,
and thus implies the Friedman rule.
3 The Constrained-Eﬃcient Allocation
First, I consider the constrained planning problem of a planner un-
der the limited communication constraint3. This constraint not only
bars the planner from transferring goods between locations, but prevents
them from give goods stored in one location to movers from the other
location. The constrained-eﬃcient allocation maximizes the steady-state
expected utility of a representative generation subject to both the limited
communication constraint and the feasibility constraint. Let cm
t and cn
t
denote the consumption allocated by the constrained planner to movers
and non-movers born on period t, respectively. Also, denote st to be the
amount that is stored by the planner at period t. Hence, the planner’s

















t = w   st+1 (2)
[1   E(π)]c
n
t = stR (3)
st  w 8t. (4)
3For details, see Haslag and Martin (2007) and Bhattacharya and Singh (2008)
7Equation (2) states that all movers’ consumption must be paid from
a part of the current endowment collected by the planner. Equation (3)
states that the goods provided to non-movers must be stored. Equation
(4) states that storage investments cannot exceed the endowments col-
lected by the planner. Given all this, the constrained-eﬃcient allocation
in a steady state fcm,cn,sg is characterized by
c
m = w, (5)
c
n = Rw, (6)
s = [1   E(π)]w. (7)
Since the planner can transport goods across regions within a location,
and since agents are risk-averse, it is optimal for the planner to equalize
the consumption levels across regions. That is, the levels of consumption
chosen by the planner should not be contingent on π.
4 A Banking Economy
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the savings of all young agents
will be intermediated. Banks take deposits from young agents in their
regions, and choose how much to invest in storage it and money balances
mt. The rate of return on real balances between t and t + 1 is pt/pt+1.
Banks promise a return of dm
t (π) to each mover, and a return of dt(π) to
each non-mover per unit on their deposits. These returns depend on the
value of π. It is assumed that ﬁrms can freely enter the banking sector,
and that banks are competitive in the sense that they accept as given the
real return on assets. Thus, banks in each region are Nash competitors
on the deposit side. That is, banks announce deposit return schedules
(dm
t (π), dt(π)), taking the announced return schedules of other banks as
given.
Let αt(π) denote the fraction of cash reserves that the bank pays out
at period t, and let bt(π) be the real balances that a bank borrows from
or lends to interbank markets at the end of period t. If bt(π) is positive,
a bank borrows cash from banks in the other regions; if it is negative, it
lends them cash through an interbank market. If the interbank market
8is perfect, the bank can use it to borrow or lend cash freely at the market
rate. Let ϕt denote the gross nominal interest rate of an interbank market
at period t.
After banks create their portfolios and learn about the liquidity shocks
of their region, interbank markets open, and they decide whether to bor-
row or to lend cash at ϕt. If, at the end of period t, a bank in a region
experiencing high liquidity shock demands cash amounting to bt(π), it
can borrow ptbt(π) yen from other banks in regions experiencing a low liq-
uidity shock, through an interbank market. During the following period,
the borrowing bank must pay back ϕtbt(π)pt yen to the lending banks.
Let rb
t  ϕtpt/pt+1 denote the gross real interest rate in an interbank
market. I use this rate as a substitute for ϕt in the following discussions.
The bank faces the following constraints on its choices it, mt, dm
t (π),
and dt(π). First, the bank’s balance sheet requires that
it + mt  w + τt. (8)
Second, payments to movers at period t, πdm
t (π)(w + τt), cannot exceed
the value of the bank’s holdings at period t + 1, and the borrowing of
cash reserves. Therefore, it follows that
πd
m







Finally, real payments to non-movers cannot exceed the value of the
bank’s remaining reserves plus the income from its investments minus
the repayments of the interbank loan, so that
(1   π)dt(π)(w + τt)  [1   αt(π)]mt
pt
pt+1
+ Rit   r
b
tbt(π). (10)
Of course, 0  αt  1, it  0, and mt  0 must hold.
In addition to the above constraints, banks also face borrowing con-
straints in interbank markets. From the assumption of limited commit-
ment, an external enforcement agency can seize only a fraction θ 2 (0,1]
of the investments of banks that choose to default on interbank loans.4 To
4When θ = 0, interbank markets collapse, and banks in each region fall into ﬁ-
nancial autarky. This situation is the same as that noted by Antinolﬁ et al. (2001),
Smith (2002), and Antinolﬁ and Keister (2006). In this paper, I focus on the im-
perfections within interbank markets and the role of central bank loans in amending
these imperfections, and then I rule out the case of θ = 0.
9prevent borrowers from defaulting strategically, it and bt(π) must satisfy
a debt incentive constraint given by
Rit   r
b
tbt(π)  (1   θ)Rit.
The left-hand side of the constraint is what borrowers get if they decide
to pay back their creditors, and the right-hand side is what they get if
they default on their loan. The debt incentive constraint reduces to
r
b
tbt(π)  θRit. (11)
Equation (11) implies that only a fraction θ of investment returns can be
used as collateral for repayment in the interbank markets.5
Because banks behave as Nash competitors and have free entry, they







t (π)(w + τt)] + (1   π)ln[dt(π)(w + τt)]
}
f(π)dπ, (12)
subject to the constraints (8), (9), (10), (11), and the non-negativity
constraints.
Let γt  mt/(w+τt) denote a bank’s reserve-deposit ratio at period t,
and let δt(π)  bt(π)/(w+τt) denote the real value of a bank’s borrowing
or lending from the interbank markets per unit of deposits at period t.
Notice that θ represents the degree of imperfections in interbank mar-
kets. If θ is suﬃciently large, an external enforcement agency can seize
large enough quantities of assets owned by defaulting banks to give banks
an ex ante incentive not to default strategically. As a result, borrowing
constraints will be relaxed, and market perfections restored. It is easy
to conﬁrm that interbank markets are perfect only when θ = 1 holds.
I study the optimization problems of banks in two diﬀerent interbank
regimes in the remainder of this section.
4.1 The Case of θ = 1: Perfect Interbank Markets
First, I analyze a regime featuring well-functioning interbank markets,
that is, a regime in which θ = 1. Within such a system, banks can
5As is typical in these models, defaults will not occur in equilibrium.
10borrow or lend money freely at the interbank rate rb
t. In this case, a debt
incentive constraint never binds, and can be ignored in an examination of
the optimization problem for banks. Both the fraction of bank reserves
paid out to movers, αt, and the real value of interbank loans, δt, are
chosen after the realization of π, while γt is chosen before the realization
of π. Hence, the optimal values of αt and δt can be obtained via the






























The solutions to these problems are
αt(π) = 1 8π 2 [0,1], (13)




(1   γt) 8π 2 [0,1]. (14)
Equation (13) says that it is optimal for banks not to pay cash reserves
to non-movers regardless of the value of π. When demand for liquidity is
fairly low, that is, when equation (14) is negative, banks are able to meet
the demand by using their own cash reserves. Under such circumstances,
it is optimal for them to lend their remaining reserves to banks that
are experiencing high liquidity shocks. Conversely, when demand for
liquidity is high enough, that is, when equation (14) is positive, banks
pays out all their reserves to movers, and borrow cash from banks that
are experiencing low liquidity shocks.
I now proceed to solve the optimal value of γt. Substituting the opti-






























0 if R > rb
t
2 [0,1] if R = rb
t
1 if R < rb
t.
(15)
11If R > rb
t, banks have an incentive to invest all deposits in storage
because interbank lending is not beneﬁcial and interbank borrowing is
not expensive. However, if R < rb
t, then it is optimal for banks to hold
all deposits in cash because interbank lending is beneﬁcial and interbank
borrowing is expensive. Therefore, banks are neutral toward the choice
between holding cash reserves and investing in storage only when R = rb
t.
4.2 The Case of 0 < θ < 1: Imperfect Interbank
Markets
I next examine a regime in which interbank markets are imperfect,
that is, a regime in which 0 < θ < 1, because the limited commitment
problem is severe. In this case, banks have to consider the possibility
that a borrowing constraint may bind if they face high liquidity demands.
Again, given the timing of the banks’ decision, I can solve the optimal

































tδt  θR(1   γt).
The solutions to these problems are





 (1   π)γt + R
rb
t (1   γt) if 0  π  π∗
R
rb






tγt + θR(1   γt)
rb
tγt + R(1   γt)
. (18)
As in the previous, equation (16) says that it is optimal for banks not
to pay cash reserves to non-movers, regardless of the value of π. Equation
12(17) states that, for realizations of the liquidity shock below the critical
value π∗, banks can lend or borrow money freely in interbank markets;
however, for realization of the liquidity shock is greater than π∗, banks
cannot borrow the amount of money desired, and will face a “liquidity
crisis.” In the crisis, the banks cannot fully meet liquidity demands, and
movers must receive a lower return.
This result follows from the trade-oﬀ between two forces. First, the
return on cash balances is lower than the return on storage technology.
Therefore, banks prefer to minimize cash reserves. At the same time, they
strive to provide insurance by equalizing the returns between movers and
non-movers for all realizations of π. To do so, they must hold suﬃcient
cash reserves. At the margin, the welfare gains from equalizing the re-
turns to movers and non-movers exactly oﬀset the cost implied by the
return dominance of storage investments over cash reserves.
I now proceed to solve the optimal value of γt. Substituting the opti-
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The optimal value of γt is given by6
γt =

   












∗ F(π)dπ if R
1−
∫ 1





Note that γt implicitly deﬁned by (19) is increasing in rb
t. Intuition is
simple. An increase in rb
t makes borrowing interbank loans costly, and it
gives an incentive for banks to hold more cash reserves. Having solved
the optimization problem for banks, I now turn to an analysis of general
equilibrium.
6I provide the derivation in Appendix B.
135 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of sequences for prices fpt,rb
tg and for the
decision rules of banks fγt,αt,δtg, such that (i) given fpt,rb
tg, the decision
rules solve the banks’ problems in each period; (ii) the market where
money is traded for goods at the beginning of each period clears; (iii) the
government budget constraint in equation (1) holds in each period; and
(iv) the interbank markets clear in each period, that is,
∫ 1
0
δt(π)f(π)dπ = 0. (20)
From this clearing condition and the optimal reserve-deposit ratio
given in equation (15) or equation (19), the values of the pair (γ∗
t,rb∗
t )
can be determined. It is easy to check that, under the logarithmic utility,
these values do not depend on the inﬂation rate pt+1/pt, and the steady
state is the only equilibrium of the economy. Thus, the time subscript
can be dropped from in the following discussions.
The money market clears if m = γ∗(w + τ). Substituting the gov-
ernment budget constraint in equation (1) into this equation yields the
following:














5.1 Equilibrium with Perfect Interbank Markets
First, I derive an equilibrium with perfect interbank markets. Substi-
tuting the optimal value δ(π) into the interbank market clearing condition
in equation (20), I obtain
γ =
E(π)R
E(π)R + [1   E(π)]rb, (21)
14which is decreasing in rb. An decrease in γ increases the number of
borrowers and decreases the number of lenders in interbank markets.
Then, it pushes up the interbank rates. A steady-state equilibrium is
characterized by the pair (γ∗,rb∗) satisfying equations (15) and (21).
Figure 1 illustrates the steady-state equilibrium with well-functioning
interbank markets. The horizontal axis shows rb
t, and the vertical axis
shows γt. Equation (15) crosses equation (21) exactly once, and a unique
steady-state equilibrium exists at that point. In this equilibrium, the
optimal reserve-deposit ratio is given by γ∗ = E(π), and the real interest
rate in an interbank market is given by rb∗ = R. From these results, I
obtain δ(π) = π   E(π). This solution means that banks in each region
will hold in money a share of deposits equal to the share of movers in
regions as a whole, which is represented by E(π). For liquidity shocks
below the value E(π), banks will borrow cash from other banks at a rate
of rb = R, and pay out all their reserves, plus the liquidity they obtain
from loans, to movers in their respective regions. When liquidity shocks
are greater than E(π), banks will pay out only a fraction of their reserves









Figure 1: Equilibrium with perfect interbank markets




























Note that the consumption levels of movers and non-movers do not de-
pend on π. This implies that consumption levels are equalized between
regions, and that agents receive complete insurance against liquidity
shocks. In addition, note that cn = σRcm. In the steady-state equi-
librium, the wedge between the return paid to movers and the return
paid to non-movers depends on the money growth rate. The higher the
inﬂation rate, the larger the gap between cm and cn, and the farther
agents are from being completely insured.
Now, consider a situation where a central bank implements zero-inﬂation
policy, which means that σ = 1. Consumption levels for movers and non-





This allocation is identical to that dispensed in the constrained plan-
ning problem. The Friedman rule, σ = 1/R, equalizes consumption
between movers and non-movers. In addition, it states that agents’ de-
posits decrease, and that banks invest less in storage technology because
the seigniorage collected by the government is rebated to young agents.
Zero-inﬂation policy is a fair trade-oﬀ between productive eﬃciency and
risk sharing, and, in this case, constitutes optimal monetary policy.
This result can be summarized in the following proposition.
16Proposition 1 When interbank markets are perfect (i.e., when θ = 1),
the market equilibrium under zero-inﬂation policy (in which σ = 1)
achieves constrained eﬃciency.
Goodfriend and King (1988) argue that, in well-functioning ﬁnancial
markets, a solvent institution cannot be illiquid, and conclude that the
central bank should focus solely on implementing open-market opera-
tions, and should refrain from helping speciﬁc banks. The results ob-
tained in this subsection coincide with their views. In an economy with
perfect interbank markets, the constrained-eﬃcient allocation can be de-
centralized by controlling only the money growth rate.
5.2 Equilibrium with Imperfect Interbank Markets
Next, I derive an equilibrium with imperfect interbank markets. Sub-
stituting the optimal value δ(π) into the interbank market clearing con-
dition expressed in equation (20), I obtain
θR(1   γ)





which implicitly deﬁnes the relationship between γ and rb as in the pre-
vious. The value of γ deﬁned by (24) is decreasing in rb. A steady-state
equilibrium with imperfect interbank markets is characterized by the
pair (γ∗∗,rb∗∗) satisfying equations (19) and (24). Figure 2 illustrates
a steady-state equilibrium with imperfect interbank markets. Equation
(19) crosses equation (24) exactly once, and a unique steady-state equi-












Figure 2: Equilibrium with Imperfect Interbank Markets.
Let us compare the reserve-deposit ratio of an economy with a perfect
interbank markets to that of an economy with an imperfect interbank
market. I have the following result.
Lemma 1 For any θ 2 (0,1), γ∗∗ < E(π) = γ∗ holds.
Lemma 1 states that banks that may face a liquidity constraint in
interbank markets hold lower levels of cash reserves than banks that do
not. This is because rb
t < R in an economy with an imperfect interbank
market. Banks that receive relatively high liquidity shocks and borrow
from interbank markets have an incentive to reduce their cash reserves
because interbank borrowing is less costly. On the other hand, banks that
receive relatively small shocks and lend to interbank markets also have
an incentive to reduce their cash reserves because storage investments
produce more proﬁt than interbank lending does. Consequently, it is ex
ante optimal for all banks to reduce cash reserves and invest in storage.
I now examine how the steady-state values γ∗∗ and rb∗∗ depend on
parameters. Speciﬁcally, I am interested in the eﬀect of a change in the
limited enforcement parameter θ on γ∗∗ and rb∗∗. Note that an increase
in θ has two contrasting eﬀects on γ∗∗. Figure 3 illustrates this change.
18Before shocks are realized, storage investments provide more collateral
capacity and are more attractive to banks because they are easier to
borrow against. This collateral eﬀect decreases the value of γ∗∗. On
the other hand, an increase in θ also increases the amount of money
demanded by borrowers because borrowing constraints have been relaxed.
However, at the same time, the amount of money supplied by lenders
remains unchanged. This drives up the price of interbank loans until
the demand for loans equals their supply. This general equilibrium price
eﬀect increases γ∗∗ because an increase in rb∗∗ makes interbank loans










Figure 3: An increase in θ









−(−1)∗∗ if 0  π < π∗
w[∗∗+ R
rb∗∗ (1−∗∗)]









 ∗∗ if 0  π < π∗
w(1−)(1−∗∗)R
(1−)[1− −1
 ∗∗] if π∗  π  1.
(26)
The values of cm and cn depend on the realization of π; therefore agents
do not hedge the risk of liquidity shock. The limited enforcement of
19contracts in interbank markets prevents banks from diversifying liquidity
risk, thus exposing agents to the risk.
In this situation, I am interested in optimal monetary policy, which is
the value at which σ would maximize the steady-state expected utility of













Here, cm(π) and cn(π) are given by equations (25) and (26), respectively.
The optimality of zero-inﬂation policy (i.e., a policy where σ = 1) is a
fairly well-known result in the overlapping generations model with ran-
dom relocation.8 As previously shown, this result holds in an economy
with a perfect interbank market. However, the following proposition
states that zero inﬂation is not optimal in an economy with an imperfect
interbank market.
Proposition 2 When interbank markets are imperfect (i.e., when 0 <
θ < 1), zero inﬂation is not optimal, and deﬂation dominates zero inﬂa-
tion.
In the problem, the government chooses a value of σ to balance a
trade-oﬀ between productivity eﬃciency and risk-sharing. Low money
demands results in smaller government seigniorage and smaller transfers
to young agents. In an economy with an imperfect interbank market,
the marginal beneﬁt from an increase in inﬂation is relatively small, and
the government must prioritize risk-sharing against idiosyncratic shocks
over transfers to young agents.
However, the equilibrium consumption levels still depend on the value
of π, even if the central bank implements the optimal monetary policy.
The ineﬃciency produced by limited commitment to interbank contracts
cannot be corrected only by controlling the money growth rate. This
result can be summarized in the following proposition.
7I ignore the initial old generations in welfare calculations, as Smith (2002) and
others have done.
8See Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005), and Haslag and Martin (2007).
20Proposition 3 When interbank markets are imperfect (i.e., when 0 <
θ < 1), the market equilibrium cannot achieve constrained eﬃciency for
any σ  1/R.
6 The Lender of Last Resort
In this section, I analyze a regime in which interbank markets are
imperfect, but the central bank can make one-period loans of money at a
ﬁxed rate as a LLR. This is in line with the famous lesson from Bagehot
(1873) that a LLR should “lend freely, at a penalty rate” during crises.
After π is realized, banks determine the real amount et  0 that it would
like to borrow at the end of period t, and the central bank prints ptet
yens for that banks. During the next period, the bank must repay ϕcetpt
yen to the central bank where ϕc is the gross nominal interest rate on the
liquidity loan at period t. I assume that the central bank destroys ptet of
these yen and uses the remaining (ϕc   1)ptet to purchase goods so that
the stock of base money remains unaﬀected. Let rc  ϕcpt/pt+1 denote
the gross real interest rate of the central bank loans, 9 and substitute
this real rate for ϕc in the following discussions. Further, assume that
the real interest rate of the central bank loans is higher than that of a
loan obtainable from the interbank market. In other words, suppose that
rc  rb
t. This means that the central bank lends money to private banks
at a “penalty” rate. 10 Otherwise, there are no banks which borrow the
interbank loans, and interbank markets collapse. For simplicity’s sake,
I assume that agents derive no utility from the revenue that the central
bank earns from these interest payments.
9I assume that rc is time-invariant and controllable by the central banks. In fact,
the assumption is that the central bank can sets ϕc = ˜ rcpt+1/pt and controls ˜ rc.
10It is implicitly assumed that the central bank is able to overcome the problem
of limited contract commitment, or that there are no upper limits on the central
bank loans. A simple interpretation is as follows. The central bank has enough
wealth to keep track of defaulting borrowers and to collect debts in their entirety.
Consequently, banks cannot evade debt payments, and private banks will not face
borrowing constraints on loans from the central bank. It would be interesting to
considering credit constraints on the central bank loans, but I present a simpler case
here.
21Deﬁning ηt  et/(w + τt) to be real borrowing from the central bank
per unit of deposits. Since banks cannot lend money to the central bank,
ηt must be non-negative. Again, given the timing of banks’ decision, the



































tδt  θR(1   γt),
ηt  0.
The solutions to these problems are





 (1   π)γt + R
rb
t (1   γt) if 0  π  π∗
R
rb






0 if 0  π  π∗∗
 (1   π)[γt + R
rb
t (1   γt)] + (1   θ)R
rc (1   γt) if π∗∗ < π  1,
(30)




tγt + θR(1   γt)]
rc[rb
tγt + θR(1   γt)] + (1   γt)(1   θ)Rrb
t
. (31)
Note that π∗  π∗∗ < 1 if and only if rb
t  rc.
For realizations of the liquidity shock below the ﬁrst critical value π∗,
banks can lend or borrow money freely via interbank markets, and meet
the liquidity demands in their respective regions. When a liquidity shock
π 2 [π∗,π∗∗] is realized, borrowing constraints are binding in interbank
markets, but the banks do not resort to the central bank loans because
such loans are costly for the banks. Finally, when a liquidity shock is
22greater than π∗∗, borrowing constraints are binding, and the banks obtain
the liquidity loans from the central bank.
I now proceed to solve the optimal value of γt. Substituting the optimal
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The optimal value of reserve-deposit ratio must be given by11
γt =

   













∗ F(π)dπ if R
−
∫ 








θrc + (1   θ)rb
t
.
Equation (32) implicitly deﬁnes the solution to the banks’ problem in
an economy with an LLR. I now turn to an analysis of general equilibrium
in the context of such an economy.
7 Equilibrium with the Lender of Last Re-
sort
As in the previous, a steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the
pair (ˆ γ∗∗, ˆ rb∗∗) satisfying equations (24) and (32). Note that equation
11The intermediate steps are provided in Appendix B.
23(24) continues to stipulate that interbank markets must clear. Figure
4 illustrates the steady-state equilibrium with an imperfect interbank
market and an LLR. At one point, the locus deﬁned by equation (32)
crosses the locus deﬁned by equation (24). Here exists a unique steady-
state equilibrium. In addition, the locus deﬁned by equation (32) lies
to the right of the locus deﬁned by equation (19). This implies that
the introduction of the LLR shifts the locus deﬁned by equation (19)
to the right. The ability to borrow from the central bank encourages
banks to reduce cash reserves and to increase investments because it
makes a liquidity crisis a less costly event. As a result, the interest rate
on interbank loans increases because the proportion of banks lending















Figure 4: Equilibrium with the LLR
I now examine the dependence of the steady-state values ˆ γ∗∗ and ˆ rb∗∗
upon certain parameters. Speciﬁcally, I am interesting in the eﬀect of a
change in the real interest rate rc on the value of ˆ γ∗∗ and ˆ rb∗∗. An increase
in rc shifts the locus deﬁned by equation (32) to the left. Consequently,
the optimal reserve-deposit ratio ˆ γ∗∗ increases, and the interest rate ˆ rb∗∗
decreases. This change is illustrated in Figure 5. Intuitively, when bor-
rowing money from the central bank becomes more costly, banks increase
24cash reserves in order to avoid borrowing from the LLR. Consequently,
the interest rate on interbank loans falls because a rise in cash reserves













Figure 5: An increase in rc
Next, I consider what happens if the central bank lowers the rate of
the central bank loan toward the interbank loan rate. This signiﬁes that
the degree of “penalty” on the central bank loan decreases, and increases
the number of banks borrowing money from the central bank. In the
limit rc ! rb, I obtain the following results from equations (18), (31),
and (32),
ˆ γ
∗∗  ! ˜ γ
∗∗,
π
∗  ! ˜ γ
∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ
∗∗),
π
∗∗  ! ˜ γ
∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ
∗∗),
where ˜ γ∗∗ satisﬁes




Note that π∗ = π∗∗ when rb = rc. In this limited case, all banks that
face borrowing constraints in interbank markets resort to the central
25bank loans, so every bank is able to meet its liquidity demands. Banks
that receive a liquidity shock below the critical value ˜ γ∗∗+θ(1 ˜ γ∗∗) use
their own cash reserves, the interbank loans, or both. Conversely, banks
that receive a liquidity shock above the critical value ˜ γ∗∗+θ(1 ˜ γ∗∗) use
their own cash reserves, the interbank loans, and the central bank loans.
When the interest rate on the central bank loans is equal to the market
rate (i.e., when rb = rc), the optimal reserve-deposit ratio γ is identical
to the solution of banks problem with perfect interbank markets. In
other words, the shape of equation (32) is identical to that of equation
(15) in the (rb, γ) plane. Thus, the pair (˜ γ∗∗,R) is characterized as an









Figure 6: Equilibrium with the LLR in the limit rc ! rb.
Let us compare the reserve-deposit ratio chosen in this economy, ˜ γ∗∗,
with the one chosen in an economy with a perfect interbank market,
γ∗ = E(π). I have the following result.
Lemma 2 For any θ and π, ˜ γ∗∗ < γ∗.
This lemma states that the optimal reserves for banks in imperfect
interbank markets, with the LLR that charges the market rates are less
than the optimal reserves for banks in perfect interbank markets. In
26other words, investment levels with the LLR are higher than investment
levels in a perfect interbank markets. This result is a bit of surprising.
The extra goods produced by storage technology goes to the central bank
as lending revenue. The market equilibrium in an economy with the LLR
is not exactly the same as equilibrium with perfect interbank markets.
In the steady-state equilibrium where rc = rb, the following equations
are obtained from equations (29) and (30),
δ(π) =
{
π   ˜ γ∗∗ if 0  π  ˜ γ∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ∗∗)




0 if 0  π  ˜ γ∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ∗∗)
π   ˜ γ∗∗   θ(1   ˜ γ∗∗) if ˜ γ∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ∗∗) < π  1.
(35)
From these, it follows that
γ + δ(π) + η(π) = π 8π 2 [0,1].
From these equations, I obtain the value of equilibrium consumption









 ˜ γ∗∗. (37)
Note that these are independent of the realization of π. This implies
that the LLR that lends money at a non-penalty rate helps banks to
diversify their liquidity risks, and allows depositors to receive complete
insurance.
As in the previous, I consider a situation where the central bank im-
plements zero-inﬂation policy, which means that σ = 1. Consumption





This allocation is identical to that produced in the constrained planning
problem, and can be summarized in the following proposition.
27Proposition 4 When interbank markets are imperfect (i.e., when 0 <
θ < 1), and the LLR lends money freely to the banking system at the in-
terbank rate, the market equilibrium under zero-inﬂation policy achieves
constrained eﬃciency.
Proposition 4 states that, if the limited commitment problem is signif-
icant, both monetary policy and LLR policy are needed to achieve the
constrained-eﬃcient allocation. Monetary policy balances the trade-oﬀ
between productive eﬃciency and risk-sharing, while LLR policy corrects
the ineﬃciencies of the interbank markets that are caused by the limited
commitment problem.
8 Conclusions
This paper provides a monetary model that allows us to analyze the
role of an LLR in an economy with an interbank market. I have shown
that there is no need for an LLR in a fully functioning interbank mar-
ket. In this case, the only role of the central bank is to choose the
optimal money growth rate. This result concurs with the argument by
Goodfriend and King (1988). In contrast, an LLR is required in a mal-
functioning interbank market. I have also shown that if the central bank
lends money to banks facing collateral constraints at the same interest
rate as interbank markets do, banks can diversify liquidity risks and the
market equilibrium can achieve eﬃciency. In such an economy, both the
discount window lending to particular banks and the money supply must
be controlled in order to achieve the constrained-eﬃcient allocation.
I have hitherto ignored the implications of insolvency. In my model,
all banks facing credit constraints are illiquid but solvent because they
do not default as a result of having undertaken risky projects. In prac-
tice, however, insolvent banks demand loans from the LLR, and there
are some diﬃculties in distinguishing solvent banks from insolvent ones.
12 Thus, the LLR policy can create moral hazard because banks will re-
spond to their policies by taking greater risks, and the public will lose its
12See Goodhart (1985, 1987) and Solow (1982).
28incentive to monitor these problems. This is a very important problem
for which the model described here is unable to provide a satisfactory
answer. Risky assets and the moral hazard problem of the LLR should
be considered in the context of this model. The optimal LLR policy may
be to lend money at the penalty rate, which is higher than the interbank
rate, in the presence of solvency shocks. I leave this important question
for future research.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 The equilibrium pair (γ∗∗,rb∗∗) satisﬁes equations

















F(π)dπ = 1   E(π)  
θR(1   γ∗∗)
rb∗∗γ∗∗ + R(1   γ∗∗)
.







∗∗) = 1   E(π)  
θR(1   γ∗∗)
rb∗∗γ∗∗ + R(1   γ∗∗)
.
With algebraic manipulations, I obtain
E(π)   γ
∗∗ =
θR(1   γ∗∗)2(R   rb∗∗)
rb∗∗[rb∗∗γ∗∗ + R(1   γ∗∗)]
.
Since R > rb∗∗, E(π) > γ∗∗ holds. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Substituting (25) and (26) into the govern-
ment’s objective function in equation (27) and dropping the terms not
























































Since γ∗∗ < E(π) holds for any θ 2 (0,1) from Lemma 1, it is easy to
check that the deﬂationary policy is optimal, which means that σ∗ < 1.

Proof of Lemma 2 In order to examine the eﬀect of a change in θ
on ˜ γ∗∗, diﬀerentiating both side of equation (33) with respect to θ yields





∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ
∗∗)]
(
1   ˜ γ









(1   ˜ γ∗∗)(1   F[˜ γ∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ∗∗)])
θ + (1   θ)F[˜ γ∗∗ + θ(1   ˜ γ∗∗)]
> 0.




∗∗ = E(π) = γ
∗.
By continuity and monotonicity, I obtain ˜ γ∗∗ < γ∗. 
30B Appendix
B.1 Derivation of (19)
Let H(γt,pt/pt+1) denote the objective function, Because this function
is strictly concave and the constraint set is compact, there is a unique so-
lution to the problem for any pt/pt+1. The ﬁrst derivative of the objective









































t > R holds, then this limit is positive, and the solution must be
γt = 1.




















t < θR/(1  
∫ 1
 F(π)dπ) holds, then this limit is negative, and the
solution must be γt = 0. For values of rb
t 2 [θR/(1  
∫ 1
 F(π)dπ),R], the

















This implicitly deﬁnes the optimal reserve-deposit ratio of banks.
31B.2 Derivation of (32)
Let J(γt,pt/pt+1) denote the objective function, Because this function
is strictly concave and the constraint set is compact, there is a unique so-
lution to the problem for any pt/pt+1. The ﬁrst derivative of the objective
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rc[rb
























t > R holds, then this limit is positive, and the solution must be
γt = 1.



















t < θR/(λ  
∫ 
 F(π)dπ) holds, then this limit is negative, and the























This implicitly deﬁnes the optimal reserve-deposit ratio of banks.
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